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Football, Concussions, and Preemption: The Gridiron 
of National Football League Litigation 
William B. Gould IV∗
“I’m a big football fan, but I have to tell you, if I had a son, I’d 
have to think long and hard before I let him play football. And I 
think that those of us who love the sport are going to have to 
wrestle with the fact that it will probably change gradually to try 
to reduce some of the violence.  In some cases, that may make it a 
little bit less exciting, but it will be a whole lot better for the 
players, and those of us who are fans maybe won’t have to exam-
ine our consciences quite as much.” – President Barack Obama, 
quoted in Franklin Foer & Chris Hughes, O2, NEW REPUBLIC,
Feb. 11, 2013, at 22, 29. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in the nineteenth century in the United States, 
football has been seen as a brutal game, sometimes with such “excess 
brutality” that President Theodore Roosevelt was induced to convene 
a White House meeting designed to form rules.1  This meeting took 
place two decades prior to the advent of the National Football League 
(“NFL”) and organized professional football.  As early as the 1950s, 
however, it was possible to witness the public’s rising and sometimes 
insatiable hunger for violent cataclysmic hits which saw players collid-
ing at full speed with one another coming from considerable distances 
∗ Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, at Stanford Law School; Chairman of 
the National Labor Relations Board, 1994-98.  The author served as an expert witness in a recent 
case involving retired football players. See Eller v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 872 F. 
Supp. 2d 823 (D. Minn. 2012). The author wishes to express his gratitude for the considerable 
research assistance provided by Eric Weitz, Stanford Law School 14, as well as Chris Hu, Stan-
ford Law School 13.  I have also benefited in preparing this article from my Sports Law seminar, 
particularly the remarks of Steve Fainaru and Mark Fainaru-Wada of ESPN delivered at Stan-
ford Law School on February 25, 2013.  
1 See Football Conference at the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1905; see also Bob 
Greene, The President Who Saved Football, CNN (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/05/ 
opinion/greene-super-bowl. 
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across the field.2  The rise in this kind of play, it is thought, had some-
thing to do with the change in equipment, particularly the helmet (de-
signed to protect against skull fractures rather than concussions) as 
well as the public’s demand for short-attention-span excitement and 
titillation.  As Alan Schwarz has written:  
In the N.F.L., leather helmets of the 1920s evolved into plastic 
models by the 1950s, after which single face bars evolved into 
cages through the 1980s.  Most experts believe that these advanc-
es, while heading off catastrophic injury, have led to greater use 
of the head while tackling and more daring play over all.  This 
leads to more concussions and subconcussive blows, for which 
the helmets were not truly designed and that can cumulatively 
cause later-life cognitive problems.  Only in the 21st century have 
helmet manufacturers begun to focus on directly protecting 
against concussions.3
The NFL was clearly slow to publicly recognize the relationship 
between football, head trauma, and subsequent cognitive impairment.  
In 1994, New York Jets team doctor Elliot Pellman said, “Concussions 
are part of the profession, an occupational risk,” and further that a 
football player is “like a steelworker who goes up 100 stories, or a sol-
dier.”4  In 1997, the American Academy of Neurology established 
guidelines for concussed athletes returning to play, but three years 
later, the NFL rejected them.5  Again, in 2006, an NFL committee re-
jected the Academy’s guidelines, stating that “current attempts to link 
prospective grading of concussion symptoms to arbitrary, rigid man-
agement decisions are not consistent with scientific data,” and advo-
cating the case-by-case treatment of players who had received concus-
sions.6  Commissioner Roger Goodell, as late as 2007, has said, in an-
nouncing an off-season “concussion summit”: “We’re protecting the 
players against the players”7 — notwithstanding the subsequent alarm 
raised by a series of articles demonstrating a link in some athletes be-
2 See generally Michael Sokolove, Should You Watch?, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 1, 7. 
3 Alan Schwarz, Before Reaching N.F.L., Players Also Face the Risk of Head Injuries, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B13. 
4 Michael Farber, The Worst Case: Doctors Warn That Repeated Concussions Can Lead to 
Permanent Brain Dysfunction, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 19, 1994. 
5 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The NFL’s Response to Brain Trauma: A Brief History, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
25, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/01/the-nfls-response-to-brain-
trauma-a-brief-history/272520. 
6 Id.
7 Id.  In 2007, an NFL safety pamphlet notified players by stating, “Current research with 
professional athletes has not shown that having more than one or two concussions leads to per-
manent problems if each injury is managed properly.”  Id.
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tween head trauma and chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) or 
general cognitive impairment.8
But in 2009, matters began to change.  As Alan Schwarz noted, 
the NFL had commissioned a survey which had indicated “that de-
mentia or similar memory-related diseases had been diagnosed in its 
retired players vastly more often than in the national population, [but] 
the League [had] claimed the study was unreliable.”9  However, 
Schwarz wrote, “confidential data from the N.F.L.’s dementia assis-
tance plan strongly corroborate[d] claims of a link between football 
and later-life cognitive impairment.”10  The turning point occurred in 
2009 in the form of hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, 
which saw the NFL and Commissioner Goodell excoriated for their 
failure to recognize the link.  Congresswoman Linda Sanchez stated 
that this reminded her of the position of the tobacco companies in the 
pre-1990s period when they kept saying, “[N]o, there is no link be-
tween smoking and damage to your health.”11  Now the NFL Players’ 
Association, which at some points in the past had said that it had no 
representation obligation for retirees12 and that football did not cause 
8 See, e.g., Alan Schwarz, Expert Ties Ex-Player’s Suicide to Brain Damage, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 
18, 2007, at A1; John Branch & Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Culture Makes Issue of Head Injuries Even 
Murkier, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007; Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Doctor Quits Amid Research Doubt, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at D1; Alan Schwarz, Football: Wives Also Suffer as Dementia Sets In, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007; Alan Schwarz, NFL: Survey Links Concussions to Depression, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2007; Alan Schwarz, Lineman, Dead at 36, Exposes Brain Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 
2007, at D1; Alan Schwarz, Player Silence on Concussions May Block N.F.L. Guidelines, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2007, at D1; Alan Schwarz, Silence on Concussions Raises Risks of Injury, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2007, at A1. 
9 Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Data Reinforces Dementia Links, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at D1.  
10 Id.
11 Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Part I & II), Hearings Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 116 (2010); Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Scolded Over Injuries to 
Its Players, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009, at B12. 
12 Cf. Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) 
(holding that retirees are not employees within the meaning of the Act and that therefore em-
ployers are not obliged to bargain about their conditions). In football, however, the matter is a 
bit more complex because the NFLPA has bargained on behalf of retirees, though sometimes 
reluctantly.  Cf.  Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 1977) (“When a Union 
elects to undertaking [bargaining over retiree benefits], the union’s duty of fair representation 
must apply.”); Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69, 72 (9th Cir. 1975) (similar holding).  But see United 
Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1486 n.16 (1983) (suggesting that the duty of fair 
representation should not extend to retirees, even when the union acts in ways that affect retiree 
interests); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 727 F.2d 177, 183 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
the duty of fair representation does not apply to contract administration on behalf of retirees); 
Eller v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 872 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D. Minn 2012) (dismissing 
retirees’ claims against NFLPA due to the lack of a fiduciary duty). Conditions involving retirees 
as they related to active incumbent employees are a mandatory subject of bargaining.  See S. 
Nuclear Operating Co. v. NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 
F.2d 247, 250-51 (7th Cir. 1948). 
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dementia, stated that it shared the blame for head injuries.13  A few 
weeks later, in a moment reminiscent of baseball’s recognition that its 
steroid problem was serious in the wake of the 2005 House hearings,14
the NFL promised to have independent experts provide an “uncom-
promised approach to handling players with concussions” for the first 
time.15  Schwarz noted: 
This continued a pattern of the league requesting credit for im-
proving conditions without accepting its role in preserving the 
conditions that required improvement.  For example, when the 
N.F.L. decided in 2007 that players who were knocked uncon-
scious during games could no longer return the same day, the 
league did not address how published research by its own com-
mittee doctors had declared the practice safe.  And on the day 
that Goodell held a leaguewide concussion summit in June 2007 
to show how serious the league was on the issue, he fought the 
suggestion that a player found with brain damage . . . had devel-
oped it through football.  Goodell insisted that the player “may 
have had a concussion swimming,” adding, “[a] concussion hap-
pens in a variety of different activities.”16
Then, a month later, the NFL finally “conceded publicly for the first 
time that concussions can have lasting consequences.”17
Meanwhile, more than 200 concussion-related lawsuits have been 
filed involving more than 4,000 retired players alleging tort liability on 
the grounds of negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation, with many of 
the allegations arising out of the NFL’s tardy response.  It is said that 
the NFL awarded disability benefits to at least three former players in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, after it concluded that football caused 
them crippling brain injuries at the same time the NFL was asserting 
that its “players were different than boxers, whose susceptibility to 
brain injuries caused by the sport has been documented since the 
13 Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Players and Union Say They Share Blame on Head Injuries, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at SP1. 
14 Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts to 
Eradicate Steroid Use, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (2005); see 
also WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL: LABOR RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF 
PROSPEROUS TURMOIL 194-234 (2011). 
15 Alan Schwarz, N.F.L.’s Moves Signal a Truce on Concussions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, 
at B10. 
16 Id.; see also Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Head Injury Study Leaders Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 
2009, at B11; Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. to Shift Its Handling of Concussions, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, 
at A1. 
17 Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Acknowledges Long-Term Concussion Effects, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2009, at D1. 
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1920s.”18  Despite the recognition that the helmet is a major compo-
nent in the concussion problem, to this day, the NFL has refused to 
mandate or officially recommend helmet models “protecting against 
collisions believed to be linked to concussions.”19  The NFL defends 
itself in the court of public opinion, as well as in the concussion litiga-
tion procedural skirmishing relating to preemption, discussed below, 
on the basis of the role of medical doctors under the collective bar-
gaining agreement.  The primary thrust of this preemption relates to 
the disability procedures providing for claims by retirees predicated 
upon injuries that they have suffered while playing the game.  
Preemption, based upon the argument that an interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement is present, also focuses upon the fact 
that doctors are involved in making an assessment about whether the 
player can return after suffering an injury, including a concussion or 
semi-concussion.  But the outstanding problem of conflict of interest 
between doctor loyalty to the club versus the player has been dis-
cussed with renewed vigor:  
Privacy, confidentiality, speed of recuperation, treatment regi-
mens — all of them stand to suffer when players see a doctor 
employed by an organization that prefers they return to work 
ASAP.  Then imagine this added conflict: The doctor who just 
cleared you for duty was so thrilled to have the gig that she paid 
your employer for the privilege.  Now you’re getting closer to the 
situation many pro athletes face.  Put yourself in their cleats for a 
moment.  Would you want to be treated by a doctor who had 
your employer’s profitability anywhere on her list of concerns?  
And further, would you be forthcoming about your health prob-
lems to someone with a direct pipeline to managers with the 
power to effectively fire you for poor health?20
The conflict of interest exists whether physicians are paid by the 
club or whether they are paying the club — but it is clearly exacerbat-
ed in the latter instance.  Meanwhile, research continues regarding the 
18 Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Mixed Messages on Brain Injuries, ESPN:
OUTSIDE THE LINES, Nov. 14, 2012. 
19 Sam Borden, Despite Risks, N.F.L. Leaves Helmet Choices in Players’ Hands, N.Y.TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2012, at A1. 
20 Sam Eifling, Why NFL Team Doctors Are Ethically Compromised, SLATE, Jan. 30, 2013; 
see also Tom Junod, This NFL Season Has Been Defined by People Talking About The Injury 
Issue,’ ESQUIRE, Feb. 2013, at 77, 81-82 (“The team doctor works for the team and so does the 
trainer.  They are paid to get you on the field – or, as Dr. Yates says, to help you fulfill your ca-
reer’ – and you are paid to play.  They are not paid to protect you.  You have to protect yourself.  
This is why the players’ union has fought for the right to get a second medical opinion and the 
right to see your medical records.”). 
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question of how to “identify protein deposits in the brains of living 
players” so as to measure the risk of developing chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (“CTE”).21  It has received professional football 
recognition only recently, unaddressed by doctors and trainers for 
years (these individuals were concerned simply with whether a player 
could return to the game after examining how many fingers the physi-
cian or trainer held up in the air),22 a problem compounded by the 
NFL’s apparent failure to investigate properly and perhaps disclose as 
well.  Inevitably, there will be questions about the issue of causation 
and whether CTE is attributable to other factors beyond head trauma 
or whether head trauma has been experienced prior to playing for the 
NFL in college or high school.  These will pose difficult issues not pre-
sent, for instance, in the smoking cases where the science was already 
more developed than it is in the concussion cases at the time of litiga-
tion. 
II.THE PREEMPTION ISSUE
The first area of argument in the substantial number of tort ac-
tions filed against the National Football League by former NFL play-
ers relates to jurisdiction and involves the issue of preemption and the 
role of the labor arbitration process.  Gaining a substantial impetus 
during World War II23 and in the immediate postwar period when 
grievance-arbitration machinery flourished as a means to peaceably 
resolve disputes rather than through self-help weaponry in the form of 
strikes or slowdowns.  Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley amendments24
provided the framework for the fashioning of national labor law poli-
cy promoting the arbitration process, a policy recognized and imple-
mented through a body of law designed for the enforcement of collec-
tive bargaining agreements and rooted in national labor law.25  In the 
21 New Scan May Enable Better Diagnosis, Treatment for Athletes’ Brain Damage, PBS
NEWSHOUR, Jan. 22, 2013; see also Drew Joseph, Stanford Analyzes Athletes’ Concussions, SF
GATE (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/collegesports/article/Stanford-analyzes-athletes-
concussions-4055088.php. 
22 The approach has now become far more sophisticated.  See Judy Batista, NFL to Expand 
Concussion Efforts, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at B11.
23 See generally Jesse Freidin & Francis J. Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor 
Board, 58 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1945); JAMES B. ATLESON, LABOR AND THE WARTIME STATE:
LABOR RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II (1998).   
24 “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any 
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 
citizenship of the parties.”  Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
25 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (“We conclude 
that the substantive law to apply in suits under s 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must 
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wake of Lincoln Mills, the Court, through the landmark Steelworkers 
Trilogy rulings,26 fostered arbitration.27
The first and most pressing issue in the wake of the Steelworkers 
Trilogy related to the question of the impact of the broad preemption 
doctrine involving the unfair labor practice28 and the representation 
machinery jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.  The 
Court held that federal courts and the consequent arbitration process 
retained jurisdiction, notwithstanding NLRA preemption,29 that state 
courts retained jurisdiction notwithstanding the dominance of federal 
labor law as articulated in Lincoln Mills,30 and that the state courts’ 
function within a section 301 environment “require[s] the conclusion 
that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in 
the area covered by the statute . . . requiring issues raised in suits of a 
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.”).  Justice Frankfurter dissented, in part, be-
cause of his view that arbitration was recognized through the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 
itself, in his view, limited in its relationship to certain employment contracts and collective bar-
gaining agreements.  Id. at 466-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  But see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  For a 
discussion of the rise of the Federal Arbitration Act in the collective bargaining agreement are-
na, see William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern Labor 
Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609 (2006); William B. Gould IV, A Half Century of the Steelworkers 
Trilogy: Fifty Years of Ironies Squared, ARBITRATION 2010:THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY AT 50,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 35 (Paul D. Staudohar & Mark I. Lurie, eds.) 
26 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. 
Co. (1960).  These cases and the policies inherent in them are discussed in ARCHIBALD COX,
LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 64-85 (1960). 
27 Arbitrator Rule Upheld by Court, N.Y.TIMES, June 21, 1960, at A19. 
28 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 
(1959).  See generally Archibald Cox & Marshall J. Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 
HARV. L. REV. 211 (1950); Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1337 (1972); William B. Gould IV, The Garmon Case: Decline and Threshold of “Litigationg 
Elucidation,” 39 U. DET. L.J. 539 (1962); cf. Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law 
Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990). Though preemp-
tion here related to that which “arguably” constituted an unfair labor practice, the preemption 
doctrine was subsequently promoted for subject matter admittedly not within the unfair labor 
practice prohibitions and consequent protections.  Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aero-
space Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).  
29 Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); see also Colo. Anti-Discrimination 
Comm’n v. Cont’l Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963) (finding that state prohibition on employment 
discrimination did not conflict with federal Railway Labor Act and thus was not preempted); 
Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002) (state disability law not preempted); 
Detabali v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 482 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2007) (state disability law not preempted).  
But see Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 79 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 1996); Oberkramer v. 
IBEW-NECA Serv. Ctr., 151 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 1998). 
30 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). 
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kind covered by § 301 to be decided according the precepts of federal 
labor policy.”31
Initially and appropriately, the arbitration process took a 
backseat to anti-discrimination law,32 but some measure of retreat 
from this position was sounded four years ago.33  In the interim, new 
cases involving tension between the preemptive scope of section 301, 
first heard in the 1960s, emerged in connection with employment tort 
and contract actions instituted in a judicial forum.  
The first case was Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,34 where the 
Court considered whether a Wisconsin tort remedy for the bad faith 
handling of an insurance claim instituted in court was authorized 
through a collective bargaining agreement procedure for the pro-
cessing of disability benefit claims.  According to the Court, the man-
ner in which a benefit claim was processed, whether it was dilatory or 
not, inevitably depended upon an interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and therefore, it was preempted because of the 
interest in national uniformity.35  The Court visited this issue again in 
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,36 where an Illinois em-
ployee covered by a collective bargaining agreement was discharged 
for filing a workers’ compensation claim and sued to recover compen-
satory and punitive damages in state court.  The Court, in an opinion 
authored by Justice Stevens, rejected the proposition that a state court 
remedy was preempted by section 301.  Here, the Court stressed the 
fact that the state law remedy was “independent” of the collective 
bargaining agreement, even though as in Lueck, “state-law analysis 
might well involve attention to the same factual considerations as the 
contractual determination of whether Lingle was fired for just cause.”37
31 Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 
95, 103 (1962).  Lucas Flour itself was a damage action for violation of a no-strike clause, which 
the Court upheld because of an implied obligation to proceed to arbitration under the collective 
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 104-05.  This policy was further implemented through provisions 
providing for injunctive relief.  Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 
(1970); William B. Gould IV, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Markets
Case, 1970 SUP. CT. REV. 215.  But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 
(1976); cf. William B. Gould IV, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration: Recasting Buffalo 
Forge, 30 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1978). 
32 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); William B. Gould IV, Labor Arbi-
tration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969). 
33 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); GOULD, Fifty Years of Ironies Squared,
supra note 25, at 56-79; David L. Gregory & Edward McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration 
of Statutory Claims, and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 429 (2010). 
34 471 U.S. 202 (1985). 
35 Id. at 220. 
36 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
37 Id. at 408. 
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Conceding that there might be preemption where the subject matter 
of the law in question is in the collective bargaining agreement, not all 
such disputes involve “interpretation,” said the Court.  “In other 
words, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining 
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require 
addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law 
claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the 
claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption pur-
poses.”38
On the other hand, a unanimous Court also held that an employ-
ee’s state tort claim was preempted where she alleged the union was 
negligent in providing her with safety at the workplace inasmuch as 
this constituted a breach of the union’s federal duty of fair representa-
tion.39  The Court, by a 6-3 vote, held that a wrongful death action 
brought against the miners’ union by the survivors of those killed in 
an underground fire was preempted by section 301,40 inasmuch as the 
Court reasoned that the union’s duty was thrust upon it by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement itself.  The principles are fairly easy to state 
in the abstract. They remind one of Justice Frankfurter’s words, deliv-
ered in other contexts, as a “bog of lagomachy”41 requiring the answers 
to be fashioned in many instances by “the process of litigating elucida-
tion” before a “Delphic” oracle.42
A union official’s state court defamation and tortious interfer-
ence claims against his employer and several employees who had al-
legedly made and discussed false sexual harassment claims regarding 
the plaintiff were held to be preempted.43  A claim that emotional dis-
tress was inflicted by the allegedly retaliatory reassignment of an em-
ployee was deemed preempted because it would involve the interpre-
tation of a management rights clause.44  Similarly preempted was an 
38 Id. at 409-10.  Here, the Court stressed its holding in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1 (1987) that preemption was “not lightly to be inferred” when establishment of labor 
standards were traditionally within the police power of the state.  Id. at 21; see also Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Mass. Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724 (1985).  But see Haw. Pac. Health v. Takamine, 
2012 WL 6738548 (D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2012) (involving regulation of collective bargaining agree-
ments). 
39 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987).  This is rooted in Steele v. 
Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), and Humphrey v. 
Moore, 375 U.S. 355 (1964).  See also BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Ship-
building Workers, 132 F.3d 824 (1st Cir. 1997). 
40 United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990). 
41 NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953). 
42 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 
241 (1959). 
43 DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994). 
44 Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., 34 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising out of an al-
tercation because it would involve the just cause and management 
rights clauses of the contract.45  But the mere consultation46 of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, as opposed to its interpretation, will not 
suffice for preemption.47
III.THE FOOTBALL CASES
The seminal appellate decision which establishes some of the 
framework for the football preemption cases is Williams v. National 
Football League,48 involving professional football players suspended 
after testing positive for a banned substance, who brought an action to 
claim violations of the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the 
Workplace Act (“DATWA”) and the Minnesota Consumable Prod-
ucts Act (“CPA”).  With regard to DATWA, the court, through Judge 
Shepherd, noted that no provision of the collective bargaining agree-
ment or the drug policy needed interpretation and that therefore an 
otherwise independent state law claim was not preempted where “on-
ly mere consultation” was required.49  Accordingly, the court held that 
the players’ DATWA claim, predicated upon Minnesota law and not 
the collective bargaining agreement or policy, constituted a “claim 
[which] . . . is not dependent upon an interpretation of the CBA or the 
Policy.”50  Second, with regard to the CPA, which focuses on the con-
sumption of products off the employer’s premises or during nonwork-
45 Foy v. Giant Food, Inc., 298 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2002). 
46 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Local 
302, IBEW, 109 F.3d 1353 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving a union targeting a program involving aid to 
union signatory contractors in targeted projects and its lawfulness under state prevailing wage 
laws); Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (employees’ overtime pay 
claims are not preempted). 
47 Carlson v. Arrowhead Concrete Works, Inc., 445 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 2006); Alongi v. Ford 
Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2004); Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Karnes v. Boeing Co., 335 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2003); Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 
2001).  The same result is obtained in contract disputes.  Loewen Grp. Int’l v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d 
1417 (7th Cir. 1995); Beals v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 114 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. Caterpillar, Inc. v. 
Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987). Conduct separate from the content of a collective bargaining 
agreement such as, for instance, pre-contractual conduct is not preempted. Textron Lycoming 
Reciprocating Div., Avco Corp. v. UAW, 523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998); CNH America, LLC v. UAW, 
645 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2011). 
48 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009). 
49 Id. at 877.  Here, the court relied upon a Tenth Circuit opinion in “an analogous fact 
situation,”  id. at 876 (citing Karnes v. Boeing Co., 335 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2003)), where that 
Circuit similarly held that an action under the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and 
Alcohol Testing Act did not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 
50 Id. at 878. 
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ing hours, the court again found that no provision of the Agreement of 
Policy was involved and thus preemption was not warranted.51
But, the court held that common law claims rooted in a breach of 
fiduciary duty, negligence, and gross negligence, as well as misrepre-
sentation, were “inextricably intertwined” since the duty owed to 
players could not be determined without examining the “parties’ legal 
relationship and expectations as established by the CBA and the Poli-
cy.”52  The court focused upon appendices and supplements to the Poli-
cy which addressed masking agents and supplements, the players hav-
ing contended that they “reasonably relied on the lack of a warning” 
that the supplement in question contained the forbidden element.53
The same conclusion was reached with regard to the players’ inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims based upon the same lack 
of warning.  
Prior to Williams, another case raising some of the same consid-
erations arose out of a wrongful death action commenced by the wid-
ow of a professional football player who suffered heat exhaustion dur-
ing summer training camp.54  Here, the contention was that the de-
ceased had been “forced to participate in practices conducted in ex-
treme heat and humidity while wearing unsafe, heat-retaining, league-
mandated equipment and without proper acclimatization, supervision, 
or medical care.”55  Preliminarily, the court in this case held, in an issue 
that has been raised in the concussion litigation, that the fact that the 
NFL itself is not a party to the collective bargaining agreement but 
rather functions as its bargaining arm, the NFL Management Council, 
does not bar the NFL from raising the preemption issue.  The court 
noted that the collective bargaining agreement imposed “no inde-
pendent duty on the NFL to consider health risks arising from adverse 
playing conditions, or to make recommendations for rules, regulations 
or guidelines for the clubs to follow.”56  While several provisions relat-
ing to medical care and treatment imposed specific duties on the indi-
vidual clubs and players and certain player rights, nothing in the CBA 
obliged the NFL to “provide medical information and guidance to the 
individual clubs concerning how to prevent or treat illness or injury 
among the clubs’ employees.”57  The court then found that the agree-
ment imposed no duty to protect players from illness or injury during 
51 Id. at 880. 
52 Id. at 881. 
53 Id. at 882. 
54 Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
55 Id. at 898. 
56 Id. at 906. 
57 Id.
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the training camp.  Concluding that the “relevant inquiry for preemp-
tion purposes” was not the question of to whom the duty to provide 
safety was owed but rather how it came into being, the court conclud-
ed that it did not arise under the CBA.  Nonetheless, the court was of 
the view that the degree of care owed by the NFL in republishing its 
Hot Weather Guidelines could not be undertaken without examining 
the significance of the CBA provision relating to the requirement that 
athletic trainers be certified.  According to the court: 
If, by virtue of the certification process, the trainers are fully pre-
pared to handle heat-related illnesses, the degree of care owed by 
the NFL in publishing the Hot Weather Guidelines is diminished.  
On the other hand, if, as part of the certification process, the 
trainers receive no instruction on how to prevent, recognize, and 
treat heat-related illnesses, the NFL’s Hot Weather Guidelines 
obviously take on much greater significance, and the degree of 
care owed by the NFL increases considerably.  Resolution of 
Plaintiff’s claim is therefore inextricably intertwined with this 
CBA provision.58
On the other hand, with regard to the negligence claim, the court 
noted that the collective bargaining agreement did not impose a duty 
to adequately protect the NFL players from risk of injury or illness 
and that the NFL was not required to accept recommendations of the 
Player Safety and Welfare Committee.  Accordingly, the negligence 
count was held as not being preempted.  And as a general proposition, 
a major difference between this case and the concussion litigation lies 
in the fact that in the latter, the defendants are alleged to have sup-
pressed information which would otherwise have safeguarded player 
safety. 
In a case more easily distinguishable from the concussion litiga-
tion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the players who 
lost money by virtue of financial advisor investments and alleged neg-
ligent representation and breach of fiduciary duty could not sue be-
cause of preemption where the investors were listed in the NFL Play-
ers’ Association Financial Advisors Program, which in turn stemmed 
from the collective bargaining agreement that contained the promises 
and limitations of the Program.59  The court concluded that the litiga-
tion was preempted given the fact that the collective bargaining 
agreement provided for the investor concept. 
58 Id. at 910. 
59 Atwater v. Nat’l Football League, 626 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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The cases addressing concussions themselves thus far provide lit-
tle in the way of persuasive reasoning.  Maxwell v. National Football 
League
60 held that the claims were “inextricably intertwined” and sub-
stantially dependent upon an analysis of certain CBA provisions im-
posing duties on the clubs with respect to the medical care and treat-
ment of NFL players.  The court stated that the primary responsibility 
was placed by the collective bargaining agreement upon the team 
physicians, as well as athletic trainers,61 as the provision must be taken 
into account in determining the degree of care owed.  In a two-page 
opinion containing little reasoning, the court concluded that preemp-
tion existed. 
In Duerson v. National Football League, the plaintiff alleged neg-
ligence, fraudulent concealment of the linkage between brain trauma 
and permanent brain damage, conspiracy to publish false information, 
and negligent failure to warn.62   The complaint also contained counts 
against the companies that manufactured the helmets that the plaintiff 
wore while playing professional football, and alleged strict liability 
and negligence for failure to warn of the defect in helmet design.  In a 
more extensive opinion, the court noted that the CBA imposed an 
obligation upon the club physician to advise the player in writing if 
the condition could be “significantly aggravated by continued perfor-
mance.”63  The court also alluded to other provisions which “address” 
player health and safety and concluded that they “may be interpreted 
to impose a general duty on the NFL clubs to diagnose and treat on-
going conditions like the concussive trauma that led to Duerson’s 
CTE.”64  The contractual provisions addressing this subject matter 
meant that the “necessity of interpreting the CBAs to determine the 
standard of care still leads to preemption.”65
My own judgment is that the defendants ought not to be able to 
carry the day on the preemption issue in the NFL concussion litiga-
tion.  Belatedly, after years of denying the relationship between head 
trauma suffered through football impact and dementia and other 
brain abnormalities, the League, as noted above, switched course in 
the wake of the House Judiciary Committee 2009 hearings.  As the 
litigation on behalf of more than 4000 retired players has made its way 
to multi-district status, confronted with the issue of expanding liabil-
60 Case No. CV 11-08394 R(MANx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011). 
61 Id. at. *2 (“The Court reaches a similar conclusion when examining the CBA provisions 
relating to the teams’ athletic trainers.”). 
62 Case No. 12-C-2513, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012). 
63 Id. at *4. 
64 Id.
65 Id.
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ity,66 it has made changes and engaged in new efforts.67  The union, rela-
tively passive in the past, has developed new interest in the subject.68
Because both head trauma and cognitive disabilities are perceived to 
be caused by both subconcussions as well as concussions, regular sea-
son padded practices have been diminished in the collective bargain-
ing agreement to one per week.69 However, to the contrary, the NFL 
has continued to push through the collective bargaining process, with 
apparent success, its objective of extending the season to eighteen 
games, a result which will undoubtedly diminish player safety as the 
wear and tear of the season as well as additional games take their 
toll.70
There are parallels with the tobacco lawsuits though, as noted 
above, it appears causation will be more difficult to establish in the 
concussion cases.  On the preemption issue itself, what is particularly 
relevant is the essence of the players’ position -- i.e., that the NFL 
spread misinformation, at least prior to 2009, and withheld infor-
mation about the result of concussions in the game.71  This does not 
seem to be related to the collective bargaining agreement although it 
possible, particularly with regard to the negligence counts, that the 
obligations of the disability committee, trainers, and doctors under the 
collective bargaining agreement could be implicated, as the NFL ar-
gues.  If these provisions can be read to provide for a duty of care, it 
would seem that the collective bargaining agreement could be inter-
twined insofar as the negligence count is concerned — but seemingly 
not on the issues of fraud and failure to disclose.  In these respects, the 
Stringer decision may possess some measure of persuasiveness.72
Again, the fundamental claim by plaintiffs on the latter count re-
lates to fraud, concealment, and failure to disclose. Given these allega-
tions it is difficult to see how the obligations of trainers under the col-
lective bargaining agreement are at issue, as they were in Stringer.  It is 
hard to imagine how the question of whether doctors made determi-
66 Ken Belson, Concussion Liability Issues Could Stretch Beyond N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2012, at B11. 
67 Ken Belson, N.F.L. Hopes to Make Move to Help Identify Concussions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 2013, at B14; Judy Battista, N.F.L. Joins with G.E. in Effort to Detect Concussions, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2013, at 6. 
68 Ron Winslow, NFL Union Funds Study of Injury Risk, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2013, at A2. 
69 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE-NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS’
ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 143, art. 24, sec. 1(a) (Aug. 4, 2011), 
available at https://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/CBA-Download. 
70 See, e.g., Roger Goodell: Owners Want 18 Games, ESPN, Aug. 26, 2010; Jarrett Bell, Play-
ers Concerned About Pay, Calendar in an Expanded Season, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2010. 
71 Bob Egelko, Lawsuits on Health Could Hit NFL Hard, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 19, 2013, at 
A1. 
72 Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
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nations about recovery time and the advice that they provided would 
be directly relevant to the question of whether the NFL withheld the 
relevant information altogether.  Moreover, at least until recent 
months and years, there did not appear to be a written policy, as such, 
with regard to head injuries.  Thus both the disability committee and 
the role of physicians does not seem to be bound up with at least the 
fraud and failure to disclose counts given that they involve subject 
matter unrelated to the content of the CBA itself.  And thus it is hard 
to see how the uniform development of federal labor policy as it re-
lates to collective bargaining agreements is implicated or frustrated. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Preemption is thus then the major issue that the courts must re-
solve prior to a hearing on the merits.  If plaintiffs’ position survives at 
this stage, it is likely that the drama will unfold, which could prove to 
be both a distraction and harmful publicity for the NFL, thus paving 
the way toward settlement discussions.  This, like the steroids issue for 
baseball (it awaits further examination in football itself),73 is the drama 
that now unfolds. It is the most critical issue confronting the game.74
Already, some of the rules have begun to change and greater scrutiny 
and condemnation is being given to head-to-head collisions.  It seems 
clear that many will follow the view expressed by President Obama 
and keep their boys away from playing the game.  Yet as a spectator 
sport football, for better or worse, is the national pastime with annual 
revenues exceeding baseball by at least $2 billion.  Leather helmets 
and a style of tackling more akin to rugby might diminish injury and 
head trauma.  Those developments and other changes similar to them 
seem unlikely to occur given the public’s love for excitement engen-
dered by hard hits and violence.  After all, boxing, where cognitive 
disability has been well known for almost a full century, continues to 
thrive – indeed the sport is threatened by the emergence of more bru-
tal nontraditional competition. That part of the game will not change, 
and players who want to share in the ever-expanding bounty produced 
by it will continue to come forward to endure the game’s peril as well 
as its profits. 
73 Judy Battista, Official Shows Frustration with Union over Delay to Start of H.G.H. Test-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at B11.  Ironically, given the amount of attention that has justifi-
ably been given to baseball in the steroids arena, now the Major League Baseball Players’ Asso-
ciation has apparently demonstrated interest in expanding sanctions beyond those contained in 
the current collective bargaining agreement.  Baseball Eyeing New P.E.D. Rules, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Feb. 26, 2013, at B6. 
74 See generally CHRIS NOWINSKI, HEAD GAMES (2012); LINDA CARROLL & DAVID 
ROSNER, THE CONCUSSION CRISIS:ANATOMY OF A SILENT EPIDEMIC (2011).  
